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Abstract 
In an oligopolistic framework with price competition, we examine the effect of abatement taxes, as well as emission 
caps on the incentives for adopting a green technology. We identify two new strategic effects, namely the relative 
efficiency effect, and the competition softening effect, that affect the incentive for green R&D. Under an abatement 
tax, R&D incentives increase whenever the new technology is non-drastic, and the demand function is either 
approximately linear, or not too elastic. Another sufficient condition is that the market size be sufficiently large. With 
emission caps, the result depends on how green the new technology is.
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     1. Introduction
We examine the eect of environmental regulations on the incentives for adopting green,
i.e. less polluting technology. To this end we consider a dirty industry with two rms
who rst compete over R&D, and then over prices. The rms can either choose an existing
technology, or a new technology which is not only more ecient, but less polluting compared
to the existing one. We examine the impact of two classes of environmental regulations,
abatement taxes and emission caps, on the incentive for R&D, characterizing conditions
under which innovation incentives may, or may not increase.
We begin by considering the case where the government imposes an abatement tax. We
nd that innovation incentives increase whenever the new technology is non-drastic, and
the demand function is either approximately linear, or not too elastic. Another sucient
condition, independent of curvature conditions, is that the market size be suciently large.
These results arise because of the relative eciency eect identied here. Under a non-
drastic technology an increase in the abatement tax makes an innovating rm relatively more
ecient vis-a-vis a non-innovating rm (in the sense that the gap between the two marginal
costs increases), though it becomes less ecient in an absolute sense. If the relative eciency
eect dominates, then an increase in the abatement tax increases the incentive for R&D.
However, when this eect is small (or even absent, as with a drastic technology), then the
innovation incentives are reduced.
We then consider the case of emission caps. Interestingly, emission caps increase innova-
tion incentives if the new technology is not too green. The intuition follows from the fact that
with an emission cap there is a competition softening eect, so that prot levels increase.
The impact this competition softening eect has on R&D incentives however depends on
how green the new technology is. If the new technology is as polluting as the old one, then
prots under R&D increases at a faster rate, so that innovation incentives increase. Whereas
if the new technology is a green one, then an emission cap increases the payo from not doing
R&D, so that the R&D incentive decreases.
We then briey relate our paper to the literature. Palmer et al. (1995) show that in
a monopoly context, environmental regulations necessarily reduce the incentives for green
innovation in the sense that if a new green technology is not worth investing in before, then
it will not be worth investing in after environmental regulations are imposed.1 One strand
of the subsequent literature argues that environmental regulation serves to reduce intra-rm
ineciencies, see e.g. Gabel and Sinclair-Desgagne (1997), while Simpson and Bradford
(1996), for example, show that environmental taxes can lead to a reduction in R&D by
foreign rms, thus increasing domestic prots. Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) demonstrate
that by phasing out inecient capital - the modernization eect, environmental regulation
can lead to an increase in average productivity. Further, the modernization eect, along
with a downsizing eect whereby there is a reduction of total capital stock, can mitigate,
though not overturn, the increased costs of environmental regulation. Mohr (2002) uses
a general equilibrium framework to address this question. Another paper that relies on
external economies is Osang and Nandy (2003), who show that with large spill-over eects,
1Roy Chowdhury and Das (2006) however argues that it is possible that for a low level of environmental
regulation a monopoly rm chooses the existing technology, whereas for a higher level of regulation the rm
chooses the new green technology.
1emission caps may increase innovation incentives.
The present paper diers from the literature in several respects, most signicantly because
it is based on strategic eects not explored so far. These eects dier from the ideas discussed
above, namely X-eciency, rst mover advantages, changing the composition of capital and
external economies.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section examines the case of
abatement taxes. Whereas section 3 examines the case where stricter government regulation
takes the form of emission caps. Finally, section 4 concludes.
2. Abatement Tax
The model comprises two rms 1 and 2, both producing the same homogeneous good
with demand function D(p), where D(p) is twice dierentiable and negatively sloped for all
p such that D(p) > 0.
We then describe the technology. To begin with both rms have identical production
costs. Further, the production cost is linear,2 i.e. cq: By spending an amount F on R&D,
however, both the rms can access a new technology. The newer technology is more ecient,
with production costs c0q; where c > c0  0.
Moreover, while both the technologies are dirty, the new technology is less polluting
compared to the existing technology. We formalize this by assuming that under the existing
technology, every unit of production generates one unit of pollution, whereas under the new
technology, one unit of output generates  unit of pollution, where  2 [0;1]. Thus for any
 < 1, the new technology is greener compared to the old one. This formulation is in line
with observations by Xepapadeas and de Zeeuw (1999) who nd that new vintages of capital
are often less polluting than the earlier vintages.
In this section we focus on an abatement tax which is formalized as Ae, where e denotes
the level of emission.3 Thus for an output level of q, the abatement tax is Aq under the old
technology, and Aq under the new technology.
In order to focus on the case of interest we have
Assumption 1 (i) D(c + A) > 0.
(ii) minfD(c + A)[c   c0 + A(1   )];
D(c)
2 (c   c0)g > F.
Note that A1(i) states that the abatement tax A is not so large that the existing tech-
nology becomes infeasible, whereas A1(ii) states that R&D costs, i.e. F, is not too high.
We consider a two stage dynamic game where, given the abatement tax parameter, the
rms rst decide on their R&D levels, followed by prices. For simplicity we assume that
there is no discounting, though nothing in the analysis hinges on this assumption.
Stage 1. The rms simultaneously decide on whether to do R&D, or not.
Stage 2. The rms play a Bertrand game where they simultaneously decide on their
prices.
2The linearity assumption allows us to bypass the existence problem associated with convex cost functions
under price competition, i.e. the Edgeworth paradox.
3Note that the abatement cost parameter used here is a linear version of that used by Barrett (1994).
Osang and Nandy (2003) also adopt a similar formulation.
2Let (p1;p2) denote the price vector announced in stage 2. The share of demand going to





D(pi); if pi < pj;
D(pi)
2 ; if pi = pj;
0; if pi > pj;
(1)
Thus the prot function of rm i in stage 2 is given by
i(p1;p2;ci) = Di(p1;p2)(pi   ci); (2)
where ci is rm i's per unit production plus abatement costs. Let pm(~ c) (respectively m(~ c))
denote the equilibrium price (respectively prot) of a monopolistic rm with cost ~ c.
We examine the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium of this game, so that we start by
solving the stage 2 game rst.
Stage 2. Depending on the pattern of R&D in stage 1, there are four possible outcomes.
First, in case neither rm does R&D, both have the same eective marginal cost (c + A),
where note that this includes both production costs, as well as the abatement tax. Thus the
equilibrium involves both rms charging the same price (c+A), and having a prot of zero.
Whereas if both rms do R&D then both rms charge the price c0 + A with a gross prot
of zero, and a net prot of  F.
Finally, rm i (say), does R&D, whereas rm j does not, so that rm i has an eective
marginal cost of c0 + A, and rm j has a marginal cost of c + A. The equilibrium depends
on whether rm i's technological advantage vis-a-vis rm j is drastic, or not.
Case (i). Suppose c0 + A is drastic compared to c + A, so that pm(c0 + A) < c + A.
Then rm i charges its monopoly price and has a monopoly prot of m(c0 + A).
Case (ii). If the new technology is non-drastic, i.e. pm(c0 +A)  c+A, then optimally
rm i undercuts c + A by an arbitrarily small amount and has a prot that is arbitrarily
close to D(c+A)[c c0 +A(1 )]. For ease of exposition we shall take rm i's prot to be
exactly D(c + A)[c   c0 + A(1   )].4
Let the prot of rm i (the innovating rm), evaluated at the equilibrium price vector,




m(c0 + A); if pm(c0 + A) < c + A;
D(c + A)(c + A   c0   A); otherwise. (3)
The following lemma will be useful later on.
Lemma 1 (i) (c0;c;A) is decreasing in A whenever either (a) pm(c0 +A) < c+A, or (b)
pm(c0 + A)  c + A and  = 1.
(ii) If pm(c0 + A)  c + A, but  < 1, then (c0;c;A) may be increasing in A.
4As is well known, there is an open set problem here that can be resolved by allowing for grid pricing, and
then taking the grid size to zero. While for ease of exposition we refrain from invoking these technicalities,
allowing for these does not aect the results qualitatively.
3Proof. For pm(c0+A) < c+A, from (3) note that (c0;c;A) = m(c0+A). Thus, from











0 + A))  0;
with the inequality being strict whenever  > 0.
Whereas
D(c + A)(c   c0 + A(1   ))
dA
= D
0(c + A)[c   c
0 + A(1   )] + (1   )D(c + A);
which is negative for  = 1.
The following examples show that there do exist parameter values for which D(c+A)(c+
A   c0   A) is, in fact, increasing in A so that Lemma 1(ii) is not vacuous.
Example 1 Let the demand function be linear i.e. q = a   p. In this case pm(c0 + A) =
a+c0+A
2 . Let a + c0   2c > A(2   ), so that pm(c0 + A) > c + A. Under this condition
(c0;c;A) = (a c A)[c c0+A(1 )], which is increasing in A if and only if a+c0 2c >
A(2 )+(a c A). Given that pm(c0+A) > c+A, this condition is satised whenever
the new technology is suciently green, i.e.  is small.
Further, for this example it is easy to check that if pm(c0 +A) < c+A for some A, then
8A0 > A it is the case that pm(c0 + A0) < c + A0. Thus, for linear demand functions, the
prot function is (possibly) increasing in A for A small. As A increases however, the prot
function ultimately becomes decreasing in A, and remains so for all higher values of A.
Example 2 Let the demand function be (1   )-inelastic in the sense that
D0(p)
D(p)=p   (1  




D(c+A)  (1   ), where the last inequality follows since D(p)
is (1   )-inelastic, which implies that D(c + A)(c   c0 + A(1   )) is increasing in A.
The intuition for Lemma 1(ii) and the two examples is as follows. Consider a situation
where only one of the rms does R&D. Suppose moreover that the new technology is non-
drastic, i.e. pm(c0 + A)  c + A. In case A increases, then relative to its competitor, the
rm undertaking R&D becomes more ecient, which is captured by the fact that the gap
between the two marginal costs, i.e. [c   c0 + A(1   )], increases.
Of course, in an absolute sense this rm becomes less ecient with an increase in A, which
captures the eect discussed by Palmer et al. (1995). Whenever this relative eciency eect
dominates the absolute one, an increase in A would lead to an increase in (c0;c;A). Note
that for the cases described in Lemma 1(i), this relative eciency eect is absent, so that
the absolute eect necessarily dominates. Hence the prot of the ecient rm is decreasing
in A.
Stage 1. Given the preceding analysis, in stage 1, the rms essentially play the following
matrix game:
R&D No R&D
R&D  F;  F (c0;c;A)   F; 0
No R&D 0; (c0;c;A)   F 0; 0
4where the strategies of rm 1 are written vertically and those of rm 2 are written hori-
zontally. For every payo vector the rst and second entry represent, respectively, the net
equilibrium payo of rm 1 and rm 2.
We then solve for the Nash equilibrium of this matrix game. Given Assumption 1(ii),
there are two pure strategy asymmetric Nash equilibria, where one of the rms adopts the
new technology, and the other one does not. We however focus on the symmetric mixed
strategy Nash equilibrium where both rms do R&D with probability r(A). It is straight
forward to show that




Given A1(ii), we have that 1 > r(A) > 0.
Summarizing the above discussion we can now write down our rst proposition.
Proposition 1 There is a symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, where both rms do R&D
with probability r(A) = 1   F
(c0;c;A):
We next turn to comparative statics. Note that irrespective of whether the new tech-
nology is drastic (in the sense that pm(c0 + A) < c + A), or not, we have that (c0;c;A)
is decreasing in both , and c0. Thus the equilibrium level of R&D increases if the new
technology either becomes less polluting, or greener, which is intuitive.
We then observe that whether the new technology is drastic or not depends on how green
the technology is. From the prot-maximizing condition, pm(c0+A) is strictly increasing in
. Thus there exists ~  such that it is the maximum  2 [0;1] for which pm(c0+A)  c+A.
For ease of exposition, we focus on the case where 0 < ~  < 1.
Proposition 2 (i) If either  < ~ , so that the new technology is drastic, or  = 1, so that
it is non-drastic, but is as polluting as the existing one, then the R&D probability under the
symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium, i.e. r(A), decreases with an increase in the abatement
tax, A.
(ii) If 1 >   ~ , so that the new technology is non-drastic, as well as less polluting com-
pared to the old one, then the innovation probability r(A) may be increasing in the abatement
tax, A. If, in addition, the demand function is either linear, or (1   )-inelastic, then an
increase in A necessarily increases the R&D probability r(A).
(iii) The equilibrium level of R&D, r(A), increases as the new technology becomes less
polluting, as well as more ecient.
Proposition 2(ii) demonstrates that whenever the new technology is non-drastic and
green compared to the existing technology, innovation incentives increase for appropriate
parameter values, in particular if the demand function is approximately linear, or not too
elastic. As argued in Lemma 1(ii), the intuition follows from the relative eciency eect of
an increase in A. If this eect is suciently strong so that an increase in A increases D(c +
A)(c c0 +A(1 )), then innovation incentives increase. As Proposition 2(i) demonstrates
though, whenever this eect is small (or absent, e.g. when the newer technology is drastic
vis-a-vis the old one), the relative eciency eect is dominated by the Palmer et al. (1995)
eect.
5Note, however, that Proposition 2(ii) is conditional on the technology being non-drastic.
We then turn to identifying sucient conditions that ensure both that the technology is non-
drastic, and given that, the innovation incentives are increasing in the abatement tax. We
develop a condition dependent on market size. In order to capture this idea let us introduce
a market size parameter, , so that for the rest of this section market demand is given by
 + D(p).
We rst argue that for  suciently large, the new technology is non-drastic for any
given A. Recall that the monopoly price satises
 + D(p) =  D
0(p)(p   c
0   A); (5)
so that for D(p) concave, the monopoly price, pm(c0 + A;), is increasing in . Further, if
D0(p) is bounded, then the monopoly price goes to innity as  increases.
Lemma 2 Let D(p) be concave and D0(p) be bounded. Then pm(c0 + A;) is increasing in
 and goes to innity for  large.
We next argue that for any suciently large market size, (c0;c;A) is increasing in A
whenever the new technology is non-drastic. Note that
d( + D(c + A))[c   c0 + A(1   )]
dA
= D
0(c + A)(c   c
0 + A(1   )) + [ + D(p)](1   );
which is positive for  suciently large.
Putting the two arguments together, we have that, for  suciently large the new tech-
nology is non-drastic compared to the existing one, so that the innovation incentives are
increasing in the abatement tax. Further, for A small, the industry becomes more competi-
tive post R&D, since c0 < c.
Proposition 3 Let the market demand be  +D(p), with D(p) concave and D0(p) bounded.
Then, for any A, there exists a market size (A) such that 8  (A), the innovation
incentive r(A) is increasing in the abatement tax. Moreover, for A small, the new technology
is more competitive compared to the existing one.
As an example, let the demand function be linear, i.e. D(p) = a   p. It is then straight-
forward to show that whenever the demand is large enough, so that a > 2c + c0 + A(2 + ),
the innovation incentive is increasing in A.
3. Emission Caps
In this section we consider the impact of an emission cap of e on both rms. This
translates into an output cap of e on a non-innovating rm, and of e
 in case of an innovating
rm. We shall argue that depending on how green the new technology is, emission caps may
or may not increase R&D incentives.
In order to focus on the case of interest we assume that in case there is no R&D, the
emission cap binds for both rms, i.e. 2e < D(c). We assume that the residual demand
6function is the ecient one.5 We need a nal technical assumption that ensures the existence
of a pure strategy equilibrium in the price game.
Assumption 2 The demand function is elastic, i.e.
D0(p)
D(p)=p   1, 8p.
For simplicity we focus on two extreme cases, rst when  = 1 and second when  = 0,
showing that the results for the two cases are quite dierent.
Case (i).  = 1: In this case the new technology is as polluting as the existing
technology. While Proposition 1 shows that an increase in abatement tax does not increase
the R&D incentives in this case, the results are dierent with an emission cap. As usual we
solve the game backwards.
Stage 2. Note that the emission cap necessarily binds, irrespective of whether the rms
do R&D, or not. It is then straightforward to extend the argument in Tasnadi (1999) to show
that for all R&D outcomes, the equilibrium involves both rms charging a price D 1(2e)
and supplying e.
Stage 1. We then calculate the incentive for R&D. Clearly the gross gain to rm i from
doing R&D is e(c   c0). Thus R&D is carried out if and only if e(c   c0)  F. Thus for
e(c   c0)  F, the rms adopt the technology with probability 1. Note that such an e
necessarily exists whenever
D(c)
2 (c   c0) > F.
We then consider the case where there are no emission caps (formally an emission cap set
at innity). Note that this is equivalent to the case in the earlier section with an abatement
tax of A = 0. Thus the probability of doing R&D is the same as in that case, so that
R(1) = r(0). Finally from (4) it follows that 0 < R(1) = r(0) < 1. Thus under these
parameter values R&D increases under environmental regulations.
Intuitively, the emission cap binds both in the presence and the absence of R&D, so that
prots increase under both scenarios compared to the case where there is no such cap. The
prot under R&D however increases at a greater rate (since marginal costs are lower), so
that the incentive to do R&D increases.
Case (ii).  = 0: In this case the new technology is a green one and leads to zero
pollution.
Stage 2. Note that the emission cap never binds for a rm that does R&D. Thus the
equilibrium involves both rms charging a price of c0 in case both rms do R&D, and a price
of D 1(2e) in case neither rm does R&D. Whereas if rm i (say) alone does R&D, then it
has a prot of (c0;c;0)   F; whereas rm j has a prot of zero.
Stage 1. Given the preceding analysis, in stage 1, the rms essentially play the following
matrix game:
R&D No R&D
R&D  F;  F (c0;c;0)   F; 0
No R&D 0; (c0;c;0)   F [D 1(2e)   c]e; [D 1(2e)   c]e
5Our analysis however goes through in case the residual demand follows the proportional rule.
7Note that in case (c0;c;0)   F < [D 1(2e)   c]e, then in equilibrium there is no R&D. So
let (c0;c;0)   F > [D 1(2e)   c]e. We consider the symmetric mixed strategy equilibrium
where both rms do R&D with probability
R(e) = 1  
F
(c0;c;0)   [D 1(2e)   c]e
: (6)
It is clear that the R&D probability in the absence of emission caps is given by r(0). Com-
paring with (4), we nd that, R(e) < r(0) = R(1), so that an emission cap reduces the
incentive to do R&D. The result is quite intuitive and driven by the fact that in this case
the R&D incentives for rm i is unaected by the emission cap if rm j does R&D (since
rm i has zero prots in either case), but it is adversely aected by such a cap in case rm
j does R&D. This follows from the competition softening eect since the payo from not
doing R&D increases because of the emission cap.
Proposition 4 If the new technology is not too green, in particular if  = 1, then the R&D
probability is higher in the presence of an emission cap. If however the new technology is
very green, in particular if  = 0, then an emission cap lowers the probability of doing R&D.
Thus innovation incentives as long as the new technology is not too green. The intuition
is as follows. With a quantitative restriction on pollution, there is a qualitative change in
the nature of competition itself. In the absence of any such restrictions, there is unfettered
price competition, whereas with emission caps there is a competition softening eect (since
the rms cannot produce beyond their cap). How this softening of competition aects the
R&D incentives is quite subtle though.
4. Conclusion
We examine the incentive eects of environmental regulations in a strategic framework
with price competition. Our analysis relies on strategic eects that are likely to be present
in many oligopolistic contexts, namely the relative eciency eect and the competition soft-
ening eect. The relative eciency eect arises since, with an abatement tax, an increase
in abatement tax makes a rm opting for a greener technology relatively more ecient com-
pared to the other rm. The competition softening eect arises because an emission caps
changes the nature of competition from one of unfettered price competition to a less intense
one. Interestingly, depending on how green the new technology is, this eect has an am-
biguous eect on the innovation incentives. These two eects are new in this literature, and
diers from the existing ideas in the literature, namely X-eciency, rst mover advantages in
a strategic trade context, phasing out of old technology and external economies. We identify
conditions such that this eect may or may not be sucient to increase the incentive for
R&D.
Further, our analysis throws up the following testable hypotheses:
A. An increase in abatement tax is likely to increase innovations whenever (i) the demand
function is either linear, or elastic but not signicantly so, or (ii) whenever the market size
is suciently large.
B. An increase in emission taxes is likely to increase innovations whenever the new
technology is not too green.
8One possible direction for future research may be to re-examine this question in under
horizontal product dierentiation. Apart from adding to the realism of the model, this would
allow one to compare the results across price, and quantity competition, thus examining the
sensitivity of the results to the nature of competition. This is beyond the scope of the present
paper though and must await future work.
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